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Training
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License, Registration, Insurance Card and
"Immigration Status"
Connecticut's law Enforcement Officers with sworn Peace Officer
Status have inherent arrest authority for "federal" offenses and
have always possessed this authority under C.G.S.53a-24.
Danbury, Connecticut is entering into a 287(g) MOI. The federal
authority is identified below:
110 STAT. 3009–563 PUBLIC LAW 104–208—SEPT. 30, 1996
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/statutes/pl104_208.pdf
SEC.
133. ACCEPTANCE OF STATE SERVICES TO CARRY OUT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT.
Section 287 (8 U.S.C.
1357)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
‘‘(g)(1) Notwithstanding section 1342
of title 31, United States Code, the Attorney General may enter into a written
agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant
to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is
determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of
an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or
detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of
such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out such
function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the
extent consistent with State and local law.
‘‘(2) An agreement under this subsection
shall require that an officer or employee of a State or political
subdivision of a State performing a function under the agreement shall have
knowledge of, and adhere to, Federal law relating to the function, and
shall contain a written certification that the officers or employees
performing the function under the agreement have received adequate training
regarding the enforcement of relevant Federal immigration laws.
‘‘(3) In performing a function under
this subsection, an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision
of a State shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the
Attorney General.
‘‘(4) In performing a function under
this subsection, an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision
of a State may use Federal property or facilities, as provided in a written
agreement between the Attorney General and the State or subdivision.
‘‘(5) With respect to each officer or
employee of a State or political subdivision who is authorized to perform a
function under this subsection, the specific powers and duties that may be,
or are required to be, exercised or performed by the individual, the
duration of the authority of the individual, and the position of the agency
of the Attorney General who is required to supervise and direct the
individual, shall be set forth in a written agreement between the Attorney
General and the State or political subdivision.
‘‘(6) The Attorney General may not accept
a service under this subsection if the service will be used to displace any
Federal employee.
‘‘(7) Except as provided in paragraph
(8), an officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State
performing functions under this subsection shall not be treated as a
Federal employee for any purpose other than for purposes of chapter 81 of
title 5, United States Code, (relating to compensation for injury) and sections
2671 through 2680 of title 28, United States Code (relating to tort
claims).
‘‘(8) An officer or employee of a State
or political subdivision of a State acting under color of authority under
this subsection, or any agreement entered into under this subsection, shall
be considered to be acting under color of Federal authority for purposes of
determining the liability, and immunity from suit, of the officer or
employee in a civil action brought under Federal or State law.
‘‘(9) Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to require any State or political subdivision of a State to enter
into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.
‘‘(10) Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to require an agreement under this subsection in order for any
officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State—
‘‘(A) to
communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status of
any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not
lawfully present in the United States; or
‘‘(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the
identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully
present in the United States.’’.
Connecticut General Statute Sec. 53a-24. Offense defined. Application of sentencing
provisions to motor vehicle and drug selling violators. (a) The term
"offense" means any crime or violation which constitutes a breach
of any law of this state or any other state, federal
law or local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this
state, for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine, or
both, may be imposed, except one that defines a motor vehicle violation or
is deemed to be an infraction. The term "crime" comprises
felonies and misdemeanors. Every offense which is not a "crime"
is a "violation". Conviction of a violation shall not give rise
to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal
offense....
The inherent authority of local police to make
immigration arrests was recognized by the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) and was announced by Attorney General Ashcroft on
June 6, 2002. …OLC’s unequivocal conclusion
was that arresting aliens who have violated
either criminal provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) or civil provisions
of the INA that render an alien deportable “is within the inherent authority of the states.”
Such inherent arrest authority has never been preempted by Congress. This
inherent authority is simply the power to
arrest an illegal alien who is removable, detain the alien temporarily, and
then transfer the alien to the custody of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
In
contrast, Section 287(g) delegates authority
that is considerably broader than the power
to merely arrest an alien and transfer him to ICE custody. Section
287(g) encompasses the spectrum of basic enforcement powers. Such 287(g)
authority includes not only the power to arrest and transfer, but also the power to investigate immigration violations, the
power to collect evidence and assemble an immigration case for prosecution
or removal, the power to take custody of aliens on behalf of the federal
government, and other general powers involved the routine enforcement of
immigration laws. This broader enforcement authority can only be
delegated to state and local law enforcement agencies through a formal
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which effectively deputizes members of
state or local law enforcement agencies to perform the “function[s] of an immigration
officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
Appropriately,
Congress expressly recognized in 1996 that the creation of Section 287(g) would
not displace the inherent arrest authority that local police might choose
to exercise from time to time and without express
delegation from the federal government:
In a March 22, 2005 ruling, in Muehler v Mena, in
unanimous decision from a Court known for its 5-4 splits, the United States
Supreme Court essentially said that asking about immigration status during
a lawful police contact (or, by implication, any lawful contact) was as
fundamental a question as asking for name, address and date of birth.
Indeed, the Court made clear that no
predicate "independent reasonable cause' need exist to inquire into
immigration status. It is the Law of the Land.
“In Muehler v.
Mena the Court reinforced the clear intent of Congress in this
matter,” “Inquiring about an individual’s immigration status can and should
be a routine part of ascertaining information, no different than asking
questions about one’s name, or date and place of birth. Local police come
into contact with people who are violating federal immigration laws on a
daily basis. Freeing local police to inquire about an individual’s
immigration status and allowing them to act is essential to curbing mass
illegal immigration and protecting our homeland security.”
Calling a decision by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals “faulty,” the
Supreme Court held that “mere police
questioning [regarding one’s immigration status] does not constitute a
seizure.” The Court continued its landmark ruling on this issue by
stating that “the officers did not need
reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date of birth, or
immigration status.”...
If there were even a hint that merely asking about immigration status is
discriminatory (as claimed by proponents of the proposed Ordinance), then
you might expect to have had at least one dissenter in that decision: Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg. Justice Ginsberg was general counsel of the ACLU from
1973 to 1980 and sat on its National Board of Directors from 1974 to 1980.
Justice Ginsberg's joining the entire court in this decision speaks volumes
about its judicial wisdom and legal common sense.
Congress expressly intended for local law enforcement to act in
cases in which officers have reason to believe that an individual is in the
country illegally, even though immigration law enforcement is not their
primary responsibility. In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton
signed legislation that protects individual officers who act to enforce
federal immigration laws, even if their departments have non-cooperation
policies.
Local
police can enforce laws on immigration...A recently unearthed U.S. Justice Department memo says state and
local cops can make arrests after traffic stops if they find civil
immigration violations, such as someone overstaying a visa....No specific
federal authority is needed for local officers to make such arrests,
according to the 2002 memo, which
came to light in a recent court case....The 2002 memo was issued by
then-Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft and his staff. It overturned a 1996 letter
from Justice Department lawyers that said state and local police could
enforce only criminal immigration violations, such as sneaking across a
border....Attorney General is stating that state and local authorities do
have the authority "to make warrantless arrests for federal
crimes," meaning that they can arrest people for criminal violations
of immigration law even if no warrant has been issued.
Editor's
Comment: The reader is encouraged to provide this information to their
agency's Legal Advisor for clarification and understanding as it relates to
their respective Constitutional and Statutory law as filtered through their
respective agency Use of Force Policy ( CGS 53a-22 )
and Arrest Authority under CGS 54-1f
No
one can kill me without my consent… John 10:11,18
It
is more blessed to give than to receive.
…Act 20:35
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