Training is the 13th Juror™
What is the definition of Probable Cause?
Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn. 508, 729 A.2d 740 (Conn. 05/04/1999)
"An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on a claim for arrest without probable cause if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). Thus, "[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause in fact but `arguable' probable cause." Id., quoting Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1455 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S. Ct. 97, 98 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1987).
SZEKERES v. SCHAEFFER, 3:01cv2099(MRK), 3:01cv2108(MRK) (D.Conn. 03/26/2004)
Even if probable cause to arrest is ultimately found not to have existed, an arresting officer would still be entitled to qualified immunity from suit for damages if he can establish that there was "arguable probable cause" to arrest. Escalera, 2004 WL 534476, at *4. "Arguable probable cause exists `if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Id. (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Caldarola, 298 F.3d at 162 ("In situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity."). As the Second Circuit has explained, "[T]he analytically distinct test for qualified immunity is more favorable to the officers than the one for probable cause; "arguable probable cause" will suffice to confer qualified immunity for the arrest." Page 11 Escalera, 2004 WL 534476, at *4.
"Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . and in those situations courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001); see also Caldarola, 298 F.3d at 162. Therefore, "in situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity." Id.; see also Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1995). "If police officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there was probable cause, there is `arguable probable cause' sufficient to warrant qualified immunity for the defendant officers." Boyd v. New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003).
Fonseca v. Alterio, No. 3:03CV1055 (D. Conn. 07/24/2006)
"The right not to be arrested without probable cause is a clearly established right." Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). Even if a police officer violates this right, however, the officer will still be entitled to qualified immunity if he has arguable probable cause, in that his "actions were not objectively unreasonable at the time they were taken." Id. at 102. "Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well established law." Id. at 102
Brown v. Aybar, 451 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Conn. 09/07/2006)
Claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution under Section 1983 are governed by state law. See Grimm v. Krupinsky, No. 04-2913-CV, 2005 WL 1586978 (2d Cir. July 7, 2005) (citing Davis v. Rodriquez, 364 F.3d 424, 433 (2d Cir. 2004)). Under Connecticut law, an absence of probable cause is an essential element of both claims. See id. (citing Davis, 364 F.3d at 433, and McHale v. W.B.S. Corp., 187 Conn. 444, 447 (Conn. 1982)). "Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Escalara v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) Further, even if actual probable cause is not found to have existed, an arresting officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if there was "arguable probable cause" for the arrest. Id. The Second Circuit has defined "arguable probable cause" as follows:
Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence would disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.
"'The quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause to arrest need not reach the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction.'" Cohen v. Dubuc, No. 99cv2566 (EBB), 2000 WL 1838351, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 28, 2000) (citing United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372, 371 (2d Cir. 1989)). It is well established that when information "sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested" is received from a putative victim or eyewitness, probable cause exists absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the individual's veracity. See Curley v. Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001); Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34 (1983) ("[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity -- which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability -- we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary."). Indeed, "probable cause can exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information." Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994).
As noted above, an arresting officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if there was "arguable probable cause" for an arrest, defined to exist when: "(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence would disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Escalara v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004). Reading the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude based on this record that it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that probable cause existed, or that reasonable officers would disagree on whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the claimed violations where another individual admitted guilt, which admission plaintiff corroborated, and given that defendants knew plaintiff had not been working at the School around the time of the incident and had been told by plaintiff that he had no supervisory responsibilities at the School.
Bloom v. Town of Stratford, No. 3:05cv217 (D. Conn. 11/16/2006)
Even if a police officer lacks probable cause to arrest, however, he is entitled to qualified immunity from a ' 1983 suit for damages if there is "arguable probable cause" to arrest, i.e., if it was reasonable to believe that there was probable cause or if officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to the existence of probable cause. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004). According to Escalera, "the analytically distinct test for qualified immunity is more favorable to the officers than the one for probable cause; 'arguable probable cause' will suffice to confer qualified immunity for the arrest." Id. For the same reasons as those set forth above, however, the Court finds that there remains a question of fact whether Mullane had probable cause, or even "arguable probable cause," to arrest Plaintiff. A jury is entitled to examine the facts and weigh the evidence to determine whether probable cause or arguable probable cause was present when Plaintiff was arrested.
Justin F. v. Maloney, No. 3:04CV1149 (D. Conn. 03/07/2007)
The Second Circuit has held that to state a claim of false arrest under Connecticut law--and, therefore, to state a ' 1983 claim for false arrest--a plaintiff must prove that the prosecution on the arrest terminated in the plaintiff's favor. "A person who thinks there is not even probable cause to believe he committed the crime with which he is charged must pursue the criminal case to an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else waive his section 1983 claim." Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d Cir. 1992); see Torres v. Howell, No. 3:03CV2227 (MRK)(WIG), 2006 WL 1525942, at *5-*6 (D. Conn. May 30, 2006) (observing that courts have questioned Roesch's statement of Connecticut false arrest law, but nevertheless following Roesch).*fn3 Similarly, "[t]o prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that . . . 'the criminal proceedings have terminated'" in his favor. Heussner v. Day, Berry & Howard, LLP, 94 Conn. App. 569, 577 (App. Ct. 2006) (quoting McHale, 187 Conn. at 447).
Plaintiffs may satisfy the favorable termination element by showing that the charges against Justin were "'discharged without a trial under circumstances amounting to the abandonment of the prosecution without request by him or arrangement with him.'" White v. Wortz, 66 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (D. Conn. 1999) (quoting See v. Gosselin, 133 Conn. 158, 160 (1946)); see also Russo v. City of Hartford, 184 F. Supp. 2d 169, 186 (D. Conn. 2002) ("[S]o long as the prior action terminated without any adjudication against, or settlement requiring consideration from, the . . . plaintiff, the Connecticut Supreme Court deems the termination prong satisfied."). A nolle prosequi, such as that entered in this case, can constitute a favorable termination, so long as the plaintiff demonstrates that it was entered under circumstances indicating that the State has abandoned the prosecution without request by the plaintiff or arrangement with him. See Holman v. Cascio, 390 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123 (D. Conn. 2005) ("[A] nolle of the criminal charge may still permit the plaintiff to satisfy [the element of a favorable termination] if the circumstances of the nolle satisfy the See v. Gosselin test of 'an abandonment of the prosecution without request from or by an arrangement with [the defendant].'").*fn4
"The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under ' 1983." Jenkins v. City of N.Y., No. 06-0182-CV, 2007 WL 415171, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 6, 2007)
"'[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.'" Jenkins, 2007 WL 415171, at *4 (quoting Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852) (alteration in original). Federal courts evaluate probable cause in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at *8. Likewise, under Connecticut law, probable cause "comprises such facts 'as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe' that criminal activity has occurred." State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 548 (1991) (quoting Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 218, 230 (1837)); see also State v. Heinz, 193 Conn. 612, 617 (1984) (defining probable cause as a standard "less demanding than that which attends an inquiry into whether there has been a prima facie showing of criminal activity. Instead, all that is required is that the affidavit, read in a common-sense manner, give objective evidence of a fair probability that proscribed activity has occurred."
Arguable probable cause exists "if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004)
GAGNE v. DEMARCO, 281 F.Supp.2d 390 (D. Conn. 08/26/2003)
The Second Circuit has held that "in the context of a qualified immunity defense to an allegation of false arrest, the defending officer need only show `arguable' probable cause," Martinez v. Simonetti. 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000), because "[t]he concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct." Saucier. 533 U.S. at 205. "Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable cause . . . and in those situations courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution." Id. at 206. Therefore, in situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause existed, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. See Lennon v. Miller. 66 F.3d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1995) (`"[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials . . . should not be held personally liable.'") (quoting Anderson. 483 U.S. at 641); see Anderson. 483 U.S. at 641 ("The relevant question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the officer's conduct] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the . . . officers possessed."); see also Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity shielding him or her from a claim of damages for false arrest where (1) it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe there was probable cause to make the arrest, or (2) reasonably competent police officers could disagree as to whether there was probable cause to arrest."). [ Page 9]
The Court must look to the "totality of the circumstances" in deciding whether arguable probable cause exists to effect an arrest. See Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983); Bernard v. United States. 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994). The Court "must consider those facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it." Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga. 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Gates. 462 U.S. at 232.
In determining whether police officers had probable cause to make an arrest, courts examine the “totality of the circumstances.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994) Probable cause to arrest exists "when the authorities have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested." Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d, 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)
Probable Cause requires “fair probability” under the “totality of the circumstances” …Illinois v Gates 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)...A finding of Probable Cause does not require “a prima facie showing of criminal activity” or demonstration “that it is more probable than not that a crime has been or is being committed.” United States v Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 50 (2nd Cir. 1987)...[P]roof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." Proof by a preponderance of evidence is assessed at the 51% level of certainty. (State v. Eady 249 Conn. 439-40). "We consistently have held that [t]he quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause exceeds mere suspicion, but is substantially less than that required for conviction. . . . Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause....…the line between mere suspicion and probable cause "necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances." State v. Marra, 222 Conn. 506, 513, 610 A.2d 1113 (1992); State v. Magnotti, supra, 198 Conn. 213.
“Probable cause is established when the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.” Singer, 63 F.3d at 119 However, an arresting officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-55, 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 (2004) (rejecting “rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related’ to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest”). In other words, the constitutionality of an arrest does not turn on an arresting officer’s ability to identify correctly the class of offense for which probable cause exists.
Probable Cause is defined: “The quantum of evidence required lies somewhere between bare suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and is usually said to require personal knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information from others sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to reach these conclusions.” (Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Probable cause a higher standard than "reasonable suspicion". In State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 12/01/2000) probable cause is defined as...probable cause is no more than a 50% likelihood... Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes probable cause." State of Connecticut v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 541, 628 A.2d 567 (1993). ...We have said that a police officer "is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest."...Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 02/04/2000)...
"Actions and things observed by an experienced law enforcement officer might have more significance to him in determining whether the law is being violated at a given time and place than they would have to a layman . . . ." State of Connecticut v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn. 123; see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-43, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983). An officer's experience and training…are to be taken into account such that, as the leading treatise on search and seizure law puts it, "a trained and experienced officer will have probable cause in circumstances when the layman would not." 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure ' 3.2(c); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 (2d Cir. 1979) (circumstances surrounding a stop "`are to be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training'") (quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61 (2d Cir. 1977)). We recently demonstrated the effect of this principle in United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2001). Law enforcement officials are trained to cull significance from behavior that would appear innocent to the untrained observer.’’ United States v. Bailey, 417 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 2005); ("[A] police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. . . . [A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists."; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)...The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. (Garcia v. Gasparri, No. 3:00cv1576 (JBA) (D. Conn. 03/12/2002).
The long-prevailing standard of probable cause protects "citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime," while giving "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a " `practical, non-technical conception' " that deals with " `the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175-176); see, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 695 (1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1989). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts -- not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Gates, 462 U. S., at 232. The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. See ibid.; Brinegar, 338 U. S., at 175. We have stated, however, that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," ibid. , and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979).
"As early as Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall observed, in a closely related context: `[T]he term "probable cause," according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation ... . It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.' More recently, we said that `the quanta ... of proof ' appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the [probable-cause] decision."
As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, "an arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause." Devenpeck v. Alford, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 588, 593 (2004)...Cohen v. Dubuc, No. 3:99-CV-2566 (D. Conn. 11/28/2000)...United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1983). Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-244 n. 13 (1983)(stating that "[p]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity."). Thus, the fact that the charges were later dismissed or an arrestee was subsequently acquitted of the crime for which he was arrested does not indicate that probable cause was lacking for the arrest. Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989)...In determining whether the necessary quantum of evidence existed to support a finding of probable cause, the court is required to evaluate the totality of the circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. In making this determination, a court "must consider those facts available to the officer at the time of arrest and immediately before it." Lowth v. Town of Cheekowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996)...."The quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause to arrest need not reach the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction ." The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and “is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996).
State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 548 (1991)(explaining that, under Connecticut law, probable cause "comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred")
State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 255 Conn. 268, 764 A.2d 1251, 764 A.2d 1251 (Conn. 01/30/2001)..."We consistently have held that [t]he quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause exceeds mere suspicion, but is substantially less than that required for conviction. . . . The existence of probable cause does not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on the same available evidence. . . . [P]roof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Eady, supra, 249 Conn. 439-40; see also State v. Trine, supra, 236 Conn. 237; State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 135-36, 659 A.2d 683 (1995). "Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred. . . . The probable cause determination is, simply, an analysis of probabilities... The determination is not a technical one, but is informed by the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act. . . . Probable cause is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. . . . Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes probable cause." State v. Eady, supra, 440, quoting State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 541, 628 A.2d 567 (1993).
State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 275 Conn. 534 (Conn. 09/27/2005)...[a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . ."we invoke our supervisory authority to require trial courts, in future trials, to incorporate a jury instruction informing the jury of the risks inherent in certain eyewitness identifications. We reiterate, however, that an indication by the identification procedure administrator that a suspect is present in the procedure is an unnecessarily suggestive element of the process that should be considered by the trial court in its analysis. We also agree that the trial court, as part of its analysis, should consider whether the identification procedure administrator instructed the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the procedure and should take into account the results of the research studies concerning that instruction. AN ACT CONCERNING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION This is a pending bill before the current Connecticut Legislative Body.
The Second Circuit has held that "[a]n arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim's veracity." Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995). "[A] police officer may rely upon the statements of victims and witnesses to determine the existence of probable cause for the arrest, see Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000), regardless of the ultimate accurateness or truthfulness of the statements. See Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1994)." Hotaling v. LaPlante, 167 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Miloslavsky v. AES Eng'g Soc'y, 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (" The veracity of citizen complaints who are the victims of the very crime they report to the police is assumed."), aff'd, 993 F.2d 1534 (2d Cir. 1993).
The fourth amendment to the United States constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The fourth amendment to the United States constitution is made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
The constitution of Connecticut, article first, ' 7, provides: "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation."
The constitution of Connecticut, article first, ' 9, provides: "No person shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted by law."
Commentary:
Let's synopsize the percentages of culpability on an artificial scale from 0%-100% to establish a reasonable belief in Guilt.
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A consensual encounter occurs from 0% to 17%
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An Investigative Detention ( Terry Stop ) Encounter occurs from 17% - 38%
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Probable Cause is established at 38% - This is an act of judgment as opposed to a finely delineated demarcation point.
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Benefit of the Doubt is at the 49% Level of Facts and Circumstances and provides for the officer to use discretion in the exercise of an arrest sanction versus some other non-arrest remedy.
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Preponderance of Evidence is established at 51%
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Guilt beyond a Reasonable Doubt is established at 87%
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Substantial Certainty is established at the 90% level
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Absolute certainty occurs at the 99% level
Police officers arrest innocent suspects...but believe that the suspects are guilty. America's court systems have acquitted the guilty and convicted the innocent. Victims and witnesses provided the testimony that was a believable lie which resulted in the incarceration and deaths of the wrongly convicted. Reasonable belief is not necessarily factual truth. Our courts only provide "fair" justice" not "perfect" justice.
The reader is encouraged to obtain legal advise from their respective agency's legal counsel. This update does not represent legal advise.
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